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Propaganda must be organized outside of the United States as well. A committee for foreign propaganda must be formed, which committee should be subdivided into three sub-committees, corresponding to the three groups of nations to be considered: the South American group, the group of the autonomous colonies, and the group of the European neutral countries. Literature must be prepared, printed, and circulated, and possibly special lecturers sent out or supported.

#### FINAL ACTION.

All these endeavors are only preparatory to the final action, to the last stroke, the decisive blow. What is to be done when the diplomats of the warring peoples and of the neutral nations shall meet? Action must then be taken upon the several governments. Our spokesmen must be ready—men of high standing, high spirit, and high mind, prepared, educated, trained—in each capital of the world. Preparations must be complete for the lesser activities, such as parades and impressive ceremonies, to stir up the masses and impress the rulers. Action must be taken directly upon the diplomats. Our representatives, the most brilliant minds among us, must be sent to the scene of the peace negotiations. There they ought to be received with due solemnity, supported, as they will be, by the general sympathies of all the nations. They should be able to speak and to write, not only for the diplomats, but for the people at large. The most elaborate service of press and telegraph should be placed at their disposal. They should publish their own

paper, if possible in different tongues, edited by the most intelligent experts. They should regard themselves as mouthpieces of humanity, to be listened to and understood wherever civilized man may hear and read.

We must take action upon the belligerent countries themselves. Prejudices and hatreds, misconceptions, and misunderstandings will tend to prevail amongst all these peoples, depressed as they will be by the unspeakable sufferings and the tremendous losses they have undergone. Will reason be able to temper these feelings? Soothing hands and soothing words will be necessary, from men and women imbued with the spirit of brotherhood and the international mind. For this task also preparedness is needed. Aid has been given lavishly to the wounded, to the starving, and the destitute—material aid. We must be ready in this new emergency to aid morally and mentally.

#### APPEAL.

This, then, is the appeal. It is a heartfelt appeal, made by one of those who share that high responsibility of insuring the triumph of our lofty ideal. If it remain unheeded, however, the responsibility will rest also upon those who are deaf, dumb and inert before this crisis in the peace movement. But we hope that, condensed and brief as the appeal is, it will reach the hearts and the brains of every pacifist in this country and abroad, and that, in a near future, we shall have one army and one staff.

Then will victory be ours!

## THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

(The American Peace Society is, in effect, a League to Invite Peace. It differs from the League to Enforce Peace in its firm belief that the use of force to compel nations to arbitrate their differences is impracticable, and that the force philosophy endangers the success of the whole scheme of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Yet both organizations are striving for the same general end of world peace through the establishment of international legislative and judicial machinery, and for this reason a spirit of mutual understanding and amity should prevail between them. The editors of *The Advocate of Peace* are therefore pleased to present to their readers so able a discussion for and against the aims of the League as appears in the following articles by Mr. Marburg and Mr. Snow.)

### A REPLY TO CRITICS

By THEODORE MARBURG, M. A., LL. D.\*

**T**HE League to Enforce Peace welcomes criticism; its sponsors feel that criticism will only serve to bring out the strength of its case.

Though the platform may lack details and elaboration, it does not lack definition. Nor has there been lack of study and public discussion of its possible workings. We have to overcome the initial difficulty of getting the powers to agree to any plan. Therefore, the simplicity of this one. It is felt that if the nations can be gotten to subscribe to its fundamental principles, the envoys charged with the duty of perfecting the plan will be equal to all questions of detail, program, and organization. The plan contemplates "not a league of some

States against others, but a union of as many as possible in their common interest."

The central idea of the League is that wars are the result of the condition of international anarchy out of which the world has never yet risen; that they will not cease until justice prevails, and that justice cannot triumph until the world organizes for justice. We find within the modern State certain institutions, such as legislature, courts, and executive, which aim to prevent strife among men and to promote the general welfare by promoting legal and social justice and by enlarging opportunity. This system was applied to the States, originally sovereign entities, composing the American Union. Entering the union involved a certain surrender of sovereignty and independence and a sacrifice of the principle of equality in the unequal representation in the lower house of the Federal legislature. The interests of the States, economic and other, had often clashed, and resort to arms between them had not been unknown. Because of this fact some of them were slow to consent to the plan. But the workings of the Continental Government, crude as it was, convinced men that

\* Mr. Marburg's article is based on remarks before the Academy of Political and Social Science, April 27, the Mohonk Conference, May 17, and the meeting of the League to Enforce Peace in Washington, D. C., May 27. Mr. Snow's contribution to the discussion also is the substance of an address delivered before the Mohonk Conference.

in this direction lay progress—in this direction light for the world—and, though with hesitation and misgivings on the part of some, all finally took the step. Once only in a century and a quarter has the peace between them been disturbed. True, the South was forced to abandon the institution of slavery, and lack of protective duties against the cheaper agricultural products of the West caused farms to be abandoned in New York and New England. But individuals moved freely from one section to another. There was no suppression of local aspirations and ideals. On the whole the welfare of each made for the welfare of all. And today the benefits of the Union are unquestioned. We naturally ask ourselves why the same organization which brings justice and peace and orderly progress within the nation may not be applied with equal success between the nations. Far from representing a confusion of ideas, it is the essence of logic. The question is: How far can we attempt to go in the direction of such organization at present? On this question, the League to Enforce Peace occupies a middle ground. And because of this fact it faces criticism by two opposing groups. One maintains that we go too far; the other that we do not go far enough.

Men who previous to the present war were opposed to the introduction of the element of force in international institutions have now come to regard it as essential.

The principal declared purpose of the League to Enforce Peace is to make war, immediate and certain war, upon any nation which goes to war without a previous hearing of the dispute. A council of conciliation will entertain disputes arising out of a clash of political interests. Incidentally, a true international court of justice is to be set up to entertain justiciable questions, and there are to be conferences from time to time to formulate and codify international law. In the measure in which nations are estopped from fighting, the growth of law will be stimulated and resort to international tribunals become more frequent. These latter happy results in their turn will diminish resort to arms. But it is manifestly not justiciable questions, nor even the nebulous state of international law, which, by and large, bring war. War arises principally out of conflict of policy. To deal with these successfully is the immediate problem before the world. The demand for a hearing of the dispute, once complied with, nations, members of the League, are then free to go to war as under present conditions. That is to say, the League as such stops short of enforcing the judgment or award. In fact, it is a question whether the council of conciliation, unless requested to do so, will proceed to an award at all, though it must be remembered that nations submitting a dispute to any tribunal may, and often will, enter into an agreement beforehand to respect the decision.

The failure to enforce the judgment or award is a source of objection to the League's program on the part of men whose opinion is entitled to respect, among them Charles W. Eliot. Their criticism is that, unless the verdict be enforced, many wars will still take place, and that, if a nation may be called upon to defend its position by force of arms after a hearing has been had, armaments must be maintained. Both of these criticisms the League admits to be valid. The check upon war would be much more effective if the nations would be persuaded to accept a plan providing not only for

compulsory investigation, but for an award, and finally for a sanction which would insure the execution of the award. But the "desirable" is not always the "realizable." It is felt that although in the interest of world peace they ought to be willing to give and take, as a matter of fact the great powers would not enter into an agreement to submit all disputes to a tribunal if they were bound to carry out the award. Great Britain, for example, might have the question of Gibraltar or Egypt, or a sphere of influence, brought up; Japan, the question of Korea or her activities in China; the United States, the Monroe Doctrine or the question of Oriental immigration. To be realizable—i. e., something which governments at the present stage of world feeling and enlightenment are likely to adopt—the plan must therefore omit the feature of executing the award.

Under existing practices, when two nations enter an arbitration they do so voluntarily. The nature of the question to be decided is defined in the preliminary agreement, and they know beforehand the worst that can befall them. When at present, therefore, they consent to arbitrate a question, they do it in the full expectation of abiding by the result. To go further and enter into general treaties in pairs looking to the settlement of future disputes, is still a very different matter from entering into a common treaty with a large group of nations. In the former case, each nation knows pretty well the antecedents, policy, and interests of the contracting party. In the latter, that fact is much more complicated. The United States, for example, would be willing to go much farther in a treaty with Great Britain than in a treaty with the Balkan States or Turkey. There still remain in the plan two steps which constitute an advance over existing practice, namely (a) the obligation of the signatories binding themselves to use the tribunals they may set up; (b) the use of force to compel them to do so if recalcitrant.

Now, why do we base such high hopes on a mere hearing? Because experience, municipal and international, points to its great value in warding off actual strife. In the State of Massachusetts there has long existed a provision for compulsory investigation of labor disputes in the quasi-public services. The power to summon witnesses and lay bare the facts of the dispute, without proceeding to a judgment, has prevented labor war in these services. In Canada we witness the successful working of the Dominion law covering similar disputes and properly extended to coal-mining, the stoppage of which vitally touches the public interest. In the international field there is the Dogger Bank affair, referred successfully to the International Commission of Inquiry set up by the First Hague Conference.

Such a league as is proposed would necessarily have an executive council or directorate sitting at the capital of some small country, and charged, amongst other duties, with one certain duty of overwhelming importance, namely, that of declaring war in the name of the League on any nation which went to war without a preliminary hearing of the dispute or an earnest attempt to secure one. And this is the one sole cause for war by the League. There is no other.

War on land cannot well be made without invading the territory of the enemy. It will be remembered that at the beginning of the present war France retired her forces a certain number of kilometers within her own

borders. If some such rule as this were set up, the *locus* of the first battle, a geographical fact, could be easily determined, and there would remain no doubt as to who the offender was. No provocation, whether by threat, either of word or of preparation, nor even an alleged act of injustice, would be accepted as an excuse. There would be no conference of the powers to deliberate as to what action, if any, should be taken, to raise in the breast of the would-be aggressor the hope that dissension among the powers might lead to the customary inaction. The executive council would be in being, charged with one supreme and certain duty—to make war upon the offender. That to declare war in the name of the League is a heavy responsibility, and therefore the fact on which the executive council is asked to act should be an easily ascertainable fact. Warlike preparation is not an easily ascertainable fact, nor is that of unjust acts. Both are facts most difficult to ascertain, and therefore are to be neither a ground for the declaration of war by the league nor an excuse for war by the nation offending against the provisions of the league.

The constitutional power of the United States to enter into such a compact already exists. Mr. Taft has pointed to its exercise in connection with the treaties guaranteeing the integrity of Cuba and Panama. They carry the obligation to use force if necessary. When the contingency contemplated by the treaties arises, Congress, which alone has the power to declare war, would be called upon to fulfil the treaty obligations. The country was justified in taking this risk, because the treaties make for the security of Cuba and Panama, and so for peace.

Our critics, pointing out that conciliation is a voluntary process, assert that to force conciliation is a contradiction in terms. They set up their own straw man, and then proceed to knock him down. The League does not force conciliation. It forces simply a hearing, leaving the parties free to accept or reject the finding. Under the League, nations are prevented from going to war to get what they suppose to be their rights until by means of a hearing not only the outside world, but—that which is of high importance—their own people have the facts of the dispute spread before them. They are not prevented from indulging in that costly pastime if, after a hearing, they still hold to the opinion that they are being wronged. In the meantime, pending the hearing, each disputant is enjoined by the League, under penalty of war, from continuing the objectionable practice or proceeding with the objectionable project.

The judicial tribunal which the League aims to create will be a true world court with permanent judges, and the assembly an embryo world parliament to meet periodically. The court, while set up by the league, will be open to any nation electing to use it. And there is no reason why the parliament, though convened and prorogued by the League, may not be composed of representatives of all nations—a true development of the Hague Conferences and the Interparliamentary Union. If, now, the League should fail of its main object, and melt away, these institutions should remain, a valuable legacy to the world. Far from running counter to the promising current of arbitration, the project, therefore, is moving with it.

By far the weightiest argument against the League is the "entangling alliance" argument. Of this it should be said that when avoidance of such alliances was en-

joined by Washington we were a small country, highly vulnerable because of our comparative weakness. Who shall say the same of us today? A people of one hundred million, with untold wealth, so placed geographically as to be practically unconquerable by any single power or likely combination of powers! The dominant trait in Washington was his sense of duty. Were he alive today, would he not recognize the obligation of his country to fulfil a duty to the society of nations, instead of taking advantage of its fortunate geographical position to shirk that duty? He saw what co-operation of the colonies meant for America. Would his vision not be equally clear in sensing the great need of our day—the overwhelming importance of international organization to take the place of international anarchy? America may, on the surface, appear a selfish nation, but she has been stirred to her depth by ethical movements in the past, and may be counted upon to rouse herself in similar fashion again. An appeal in a high cause involving sacrifice, even hardship and suffering, would go farther today than is dreamed of by the high priests of gain and ease and security. Thousands of Americans who have not shut their eyes and ears to the sights and sounds of this awful day are ready for some attempt to destroy the monster war, and ready to have their country play its part as the mother of men.

A people wedded to justice will not be afraid to assume its share of responsibility in a league of nations in order to lighten the curse of war in the world, even though it involves risks, for the principal objection to war is that it is such a wholesale source of injustice, public and private.

We teach our children not to mind so much what is done to them, but to mind very much what is done to others; to be slow to resent little offenses and slights, and even injuries, they themselves suffer; but to be ready at all times to act when some one else is being persecuted or injured. We teach them, too, that the only fear any one should have is the fear of doing wrong. Has not the day arrived when these should likewise be substantially the standards of conduct for nations? I say "substantially," because the standards of private conduct are modified for nations by the fact that the nation is a trustee of the interests of its people and of its special form of civilization, including the political principles which it represents.

In most civilized countries, the day is past when a principal obligation of the individual is to insist on his rights. It is the side of duty, rather than rights, which is emphasized today, and the new order of international society toward which the nations are moving will do the same.

I feel strongly that the present evil of recurring war is due largely to the selfish motives which have dominated the policies of all nations in the past. The United States probably has been governed by them less than other countries, but even its attitude leaves much to be desired. A better day cannot dawn until it is realized that in general the future interests of a nation will be found to lie in the direction of a present duty to the society of nations. The fact that Europe permitted the crime of 1870 made possible the crime of 1914. The tragedy we are now witnessing holds within it the seeds of untold future disaster for all of us. And unless the neutral world realizes the significance of it, unless it acts

now as if the society of nations were already in existence and assumes its full share of responsibility for the triumph of the right, the seed will bring its harvest.

Has not the time come when this great country should stand for the right, should strike for the right when necessary, and should help organize the world for right? And how much less frequent the need of striking at all when such absolute and potential power as a league of all that the great nations will represent shall be back of the right!

Until we have such organization no country can be really free. Plato has defined the free man as one who has sufficient control over his appetites to be governed by reason in choosing between good and evil. What nation today is free to choose between good and evil? How few the nations that would not lay down the burden of armaments if they felt themselves free to do so! Within the State true liberty is secured only by a surrender of license; that is, by self-denial and by a measure of restraint imposed upon each by all. Society implies restraint—self-restraint and restraint from without. In the society of nations there can be no true liberty without surrender in some measure of sovereignty and independence. It is the duty of the United States to help in organizing the world for justice, because it is only through justice that peace can be secured. A selfish policy which leaves a government apathetic to a universal woe, and causes it to act only when its own rights are trespassed upon, cannot produce peace. There must be co-operation with other nations in the cause of justice. Thus much for sacrifice, if sacrifice be called for.

But, while ready for it if need be, we cannot admit that the plan of the League to Enforce Peace would actually involve the United States in wars. The League would not be instituted unless it embraced all, or nearly all, of the great nations. Its military power would then be overwhelmingly preponderant. Now, what is the dominant demand of the League? A hearing of the dispute before going to war! Could any demand be more reasonable, more just? We are charged with planning an oligarchy implying oppression. If we sought to enforce the award of a tribunal in disputes involving conflicts of political policy there would really be danger of oppression. To avoid this, we should then demand that the league embrace not only all, or nearly all, the great nations, but the smaller progressive nations as well, so that out of their united action substantial justice might emerge. But what injustice, what oppression, can arise from a demand for a hearing which leaves the disputant free to go to war afterwards? And is there any nation, however powerful, which would refuse it if faced, as it would be, with the alternative of having to wage war against practically the civilized world?

On July 25th, 1914, Sazonof asked that England place herself clearly on the side of Russia and France. Such an act on the part of the British Cabinet was not possible because, until the German purpose was disclosed by the invasion of Belgium, it was doubtful whether the people of the British isles would support the government in a hostile attitude toward the central powers. But the opinion is general today that if Germany had known with certainty that England would line up against her, she would not have declared war. Under the plan of the League, Germany would have known that she would have not only England to reckon with, but

Italy and the United States and the A. B. C. countries of South America, not to mention minor members of the League. Now, is it reasonable to suppose that, facing such a possibility, she would have denied Sir Edward Grey's demand for a conference over the dispute?

The only loss a nation could suffer by a hearing would be that of being deprived of the advantage of superior preparedness. And is not that one of the very advantages we want to take away from nations in the general interest? Nations bent on aggression would go through the form of a hearing, and proceed with their designs afterwards. There would, therefore, still be wars. But it is inconceivable that the league as such would ever be called upon to wage war under the terms of the compact. It is possible that, after a hearing, the nations may still regard a threatened war as so unjust or so dangerous to the world at large that they will come together and say: "This may not be." But that they may do now.

Objection is made that the league plan calls for co-operation with monarchies. In many constitutional monarchies, such as those of Italy, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, etc., the people practically enjoy self-government. France and Switzerland are republics, and England is a true democracy despite its monarchical form of government. Drawing our love of liberty originally from England, we have paid back the debt. The example of the successful practice of a broad democracy here encouraged its growth, not only in the mother country, but generally throughout the world. Social democracy, which is opportunity to rise in life, and is largely the result of economic conditions, is greater in all new countries than in the countries of the old world. It is greater in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States than in England. But when we come to political democracy, which is the opportunity for the will of the people to express itself in law, there is more of that in England than in the United States. If one knows what the will of the English people is, he can pretty well gauge the action of the English Parliament. Is the same true here? Old age and disability pensions every justice-loving man of the United States would like to see established here. Have we got them? If it be the fault of Federal or State constitutions, does this alter the fact?

## CO-OPERATION VERSUS COMPULSION IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS

By ALPHEUS H. SNOW

**D**URING the past two years, perhaps as a result of the war, a plan has been seriously advanced and widely supported for organizing a League of Nations on a compulsive basis, and during the same period a plan of wider scope has been brought forward, with equal seriousness and with a considerable following, for organizing the whole society of nations on a compulsive basis.

The first plan is that of the League to Enforce Peace. The other is that of the Fabian Society of London. The latter is a proposal for organizing all the nations compulsively under what is called a "supernational authority." This "supernational authority" is to have conciliative, judicial, legislative, and executive functions and

organs, and is to enforce its decisions by means of an international police and by economic force. The plan recognizes and provides for large district unions of nations after the manner of the Pan American Union—each district union co-operating with the others to uphold the society of nations and the supernational authority. The eight great powers are to occupy a special position in the whole organization, evidently as an Inner League to Enforce Peace.

Such movements, so elaborated and so supported, challenge our attention and consideration. It is our duty to examine them, and either to support them or to state our reasons for opposing them when suitable opportunity is given.

For myself, I wish to say that my objections to such a scheme are not based on any notion or belief that the use of force is not justifiable in any case. The experience of mankind has, I believe, abundantly proved that in some kinds of organization the use of force is necessary, and therefore justifiable. Whether force ought to be used in a particular political organization depends upon whether it is possible to use it in that political society so as to effect the object of that society. In the society of nations, or in any league of nations, it seems to me that the use of force is impracticable, and therefore unjustifiable. I shall therefore attempt to base my objections on accepted principles of political science and on considerations of practical politics.

The plan of constitution of the proposed league consists of a contracting clause and four articles. By the contracting clause the United States and some other nations—evidently less than all—are to constitute themselves into a political union described as a "League," the members binding themselves to the observance of the four articles. No object is stated; no fundamental principles of individual and national right and duty are declared; no constitutional prohibitions designed to safeguard these fundamental principles are to be accepted by the signatory nations; no legal limitations of any kind upon the processes and organs provided for in the four articles are established.

The first article obligates the signatories to use the process of judicial settlement as respects all "justiciable" questions, subject only to the limitations of treaties—that is to say, in conformity with particular or general agreements—and provides for the institution of an organ or organs of adjudication called "a judicial tribunal."

The second article obligates the signatories to use the process of conciliation as respects all other questions arising between them not settled by negotiation, and provides for the institution of an organ or organs of conciliation called "a council of conciliation."

The third article obligates the signatories jointly to use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted, as provided in the foregoing two articles, but fails to institute any organ to determine, direct, and apply the force.

The fourth article provides for the process of formulation and codification of rules of international law, which formulations and codifications, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern the decisions of the organ or or-

gans described in the first article as "a judicial tribunal." The fourth article also obligates the signatories to institute an organ or organs of formulation and codification of the rules of international law described as "conferences."

Such being the provisions of the proposed constitution of the League of Nations to Enforce Peace, let us consider them briefly.

In the first place, it must be recognized that no criticism is made or intended of the first, second, and fourth articles of the constitution taken by themselves. These articles provide for a general treaty binding the signatory nations to use processes and establish organs of adjudication, conciliation, and law formulation. These processes and these organs are, as pointed out by Dr. John Bassett Moore, in his learned and inspiring address as the presiding officer of the last Mohonk Conference, the normal processes and organs of the co-operative and non-compulsive form of organization. This conference incorporated in its platform of last year resolutions advocating the general application of these processes and the general establishment of these organs between nations. The League to Enforce Peace proposes to take the processes and organs which are peculiar to voluntary and co-operative organization, and make them compulsive. The normal processes and organs of the compulsive form of organization are, of course, the legislative, the judicial, and the executive. The plan of the League to Enforce Peace therefore is an attempt to confuse two antithetical forms of organization.

The plan assumes that a league of nations could compel any member nation to submission in a manner comparable with that by which a nation compels its citizens and societies to submission. A war waged by a coalition of nations having five hundred millions of population against a nation having a hundred millions would doubtless not be able to effect the submission of the nation. It would, however, mean practically universal war, followed by universal bankruptcy and famine. In proposing a compulsion of nations, therefore, the plan seems to propose an impossibility in fact.

The constitution of the proposed league may be construed as providing that the league shall compel its members to submit to having their disputes with other members submitted to adjudication or conciliation, or as providing that the league shall punish or abolish any nation refusing to submit to adjudication or conciliation. If it is to be construed as proposing to compel submission to conciliation, it proposes an impossibility in the nature of things. Such use of force is negated by the definition of conciliation. The word "conciliation" is the one selected by the English-speaking part of the world to express a wholly voluntary and persuasive process by which a person brings the influence of religious belief, of experience and of reason, to bear upon the minds and consciences of other persons who are involved in a disagreement which is becoming or has become a dispute, and which may lead to violence. The sole purpose and end of conciliation is to induce the disagreeing or disputing parties voluntarily to agree. That force may be used in aid of conciliation is doubtless true, but the plan does not so limit the use of force. It provides for conquering a nation and forcing it to submit to the league's will when it has refused to submit to adjudication or conciliation. This is a compulsion



placing a nation at the mercy of the other members of the league whenever they, after condemning it as a violator of the league's constitution, succeed in conquering it. Such provisions for conquering and punishing, or perhaps dividing and abolishing, nations are abhorrent to modern ideas.

The plan contains no provision for an executive to wield the force of the union, nor for a permanent legislature to determine how the force is to be used. The force used is to be joint force—that is, joint and several force—not united force. The experience of mankind in the use of the compulsive form of organization warns us of the dangers of the use of any force in any organized society, or union of organized societies, except the united force of the society in aid of the powers which are conferred on it by the members, and which are constitutionally and legally limited by a fundamental constitution. When the law and will of the society is constitutionally formulated, declared, and applied by its legislative, judicial, and executive organs, the executive, when necessary, wields the force of the society so as to make its law effective in determining the actions and relationships of the members in their own and the common interest. An organized society or union wielding force, without a definite legislative and executive organ to direct the force in execution of the legally limited judgment and will of the society, is a political anomaly of the kind aptly described by Jefferson as an “entangling alliance.” It is an alliance, because it is an imperfect and defective union; it is entangling, because it involves the members of the imperfect and defective union in a tangled mass of relationships and activities, for the disentanglement of which force is used without adequate determination, direction, and limitation, and without those arrangements for solving disagreements before they reach the acute stage of dispute which is essential to the orderly, economical, and efficient use of force.

As illustrating the possibilities of entanglement, it is only necessary to consider some of the questions which each of the signatory nations in the proposed league would have to decide for itself in order that their economic and military forces might be used jointly. What “question” in a given case is to be “submitted,” of all the various questions which are possible to be regarded as the questions in dispute when great nations or great groups of nations stand threatening each other and on the verge of war? What is a “submission” of a dispute to adjudication or to conciliation? What is an act of hostility? What is economic force? How shall it be used in a given case? What shall happen if both, or all, the nations between whom questions arise insist that they will not submit their dispute to adjudication or conciliation, and proceed to fight regardless of the rest? Is it to be permitted, when both parties to the dispute violate their obligations as members of the league and engage in war, that the others may be neutral, or must the non-disputants fight both the disputants? Would any member of the league which felt that both belligerents had violated its provisions be able to claim any rights or perform any duties as a neutral, if other nations of the league held that only one of the belligerents had violated the constitution of the league?

The proposal that the members of the league shall use joint economic and military force recognizes and legal-

izes the use of military force to bring into operation the destructive economic forces of cold and hunger. Economic force used to compel submission, if morally justifiable at all, can only be justified when used as humanely as possible by a skillful legislature and executive of a responsible organized society. In time of peace economic force may be so directed as to affect classes of people, to the benefit of all. In times of war, however, it can only be used to compel submission, and inevitably injures both combatants and non-combatants. Economic force used in war, or as a substitute for military force in compelling submission, destroys alike infants, children, women, the sick, the aged, as well as the men of fighting age and ability. The horrors of its use far surpass the horrors of war between armed men. The use of economic force to compel submission—whether by encirclement and siege on land, by blockage of commercial ports, by destroying unarmed ships of commerce, by general embargo, by general prohibitive tariff, or by prohibitive regulations designed to effect a boycott—recoils upon those who use it. Not only does such use of economic force generally involve the nation using it in economic loss, but, since it involves the destruction of the weak, the innocent, and the helpless, it decivilizes the people of the nation using it and sets back civilization generally.

The league, therefore, in order not to be an entangling alliance, and in order not to extend the inhumane and decivilizing use of economic force, must have a permanent legislature and an executive. But if these are added, the plan becomes one for establishing a Federal State out of widely-separated nations. The failure of the Imperial Federation movement in the British Empire shows that a Federal State composed of non-contiguous States or nations is an impossibility.

The proposed constitution of the league makes no reference to the greater part of the internal relationships of the league, and none at all to its external relationships. That such a league would arouse suspicion and jealousy on the part of the omitted nations goes without saying. The league, in order to have an opportunity to be internally peaceful, would have to be so completely dominant over all nations outside it that those nations—either separately or in alliance—would never dare to attack it or any member of it. A dominant league would soon bring under its control all the weak and backward nations outside it, and the world would find itself in the hands of an oligarchy of widely separated nations—an oligarchy which would itself ultimately be ruled by the nation or nations controlling the sea.

The proposed constitution of the league, whether it provides for a weak league, a strong league, or a dominating league, is inconsistent with the whole conception of the society of nations and of the laws of nations recognized, formulated, and applied by that society, which has been slowly built up by the thought and effort of the world. A league of separated nations differs in nature from a league of contiguous nations. A league of separated nations must, in order to live, be dominant at sea, and probably also on the land and in the air. A league of contiguous nations forms a district in the whole organization of the earth's surface, and its local self-government is consistent with the local self-government of other district leagues. If the world were divided among several great district leagues or unions, they would tend

to establish a supernational authority over all. A league of separated nations, on the other hand, would tend to be the supernational authority. If there were several such leagues, they would tend to fight until one of them became the supernational authority.

Finally, the plan exposes all nations to new and real dangers. It is said by the promoters of the plan that the league is not dangerous to its members or to the nations outside of it, because the members will never be called upon to perform their obligation to go to war, since the mere existence of the league and the fear of joint action will keep the peace. The hard experience of many men and women who have entered into dangerous obligations on representations made to them by persons they have trusted that they would never be required to fulfill their obligations proves the fallaciousness of this plea.

We conclude, therefore, that the proposed constitution of the League to Enforce Peace is objectionable:

Because it seeks to use the processes and organs which are suitable only for the voluntary and co-operative form of organization and to make them compulsive;

Because it proposes compulsion of great nations by a number of great nations, which is either an impossibility or a plan for universalizing war;

Because it either proposes to submit to possible destruction nations adjudged by the league to have violated its constitution, and thereby ultimately to establish a world monopoly, or to compel submission to conciliation, which is impossible in the nature of things;

Because it lacks a permanent legislature and an executive, and thereby provides for an entangling alliance and an indefinite and disorderly extension of economic force which, however applied, is essentially inhuman, since it operates upon non-combatants as well as combatants;

Because, if a permanent legislature and an executive be added, the plan becomes one for the establishment of a Federal State composed of widely separated nations, which experience shows to be impossible;

Because the league must either be weak and subject to external attack, or dominant over all outside nations;

Because the league, being composed of scattered nations, whether it be weak and precarious, or strong and dominant, is inconsistent with the whole conception of the society of nations and the law of nations, and tends to the destruction of international order and law;

Because the league is not, as its advocates would have us believe, a means of producing universal peace without danger to its members, but, if carried into effect, would be a political union of an imperfect and defective kind, involving its members in complicated and highly onerous relationships, and imposing upon each obligations which it must fulfil at the risk of its destruction by the others.

Are we, then, driven to the conclusion that there is no hope for a more economical, efficient, and therefore peaceful, organization of the society of nations except by organizing that society into a Federal State, which is clearly beyond the range of practical politics? I believe not. The possibilities of voluntary and co-operative organization have not yet been exhausted. In the industrial world, as at present organized, enormous groups and societies and corporations carry on their operations and settle their disputes and strikes by

wholly voluntary and conciliative methods. The success attained in this field should stimulate those who are interested in political organization on a vast scale to explore the possibilities of this new science of co-operative organization. The great industrial groups and societies of the modern industrial world resemble nations in that no compulsion of them by the State is possible, because their power rivals that of the State itself. But experience seems to have shown that not only is compulsion of those vast societies impossible, but that it is also unnecessary, since the increasing reasonableness of democratically organized societies, under modern conditions of universal education, makes conciliation increasingly possible. It may well be that the voluntary processes and organs which have been found suitable for holding in co-operative union the great industrial groups and societies may prove to be more effective for holding the nations together in peace than the compulsive processes and organs which we use in our Federal States.

Moreover, the nations of the world are now actually organized as a voluntary and co-operative union under the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. That convention, as adopted by the First Hague Conference, was accepted by all the nations of the world except three small nations—Costa Rica, Honduras, and Korea—the last named of which has since lost its independence. It was thus, to all intents and purposes, a unanimous and universal compact of all nations. It formed the signatory nations into a union by establishing certain processes for determining their relationships as members of the union, and by instituting certain organs of the union to carry on these processes. It was thus a constitution. By its universal acceptance the union of all nations became a matter of political fact and practical politics. The union thus constituted was an organized political society with processes and organs of conciliation, arbitration, and law formulation. The convention, as originally adopted, still holds, although the revisions and amendments made at the Second Conference, in 1907, have not yet received unanimous adoption.

The union of nations thus constituted was, however, a very imperfect union. The processes were unscientific and the organs were inadequate. These processes may be made more scientific and these organs may be made more adequate. To do this would be doing, in a new way and on a broader scale, what our American statesmen did in 1787—it would be the formation of "a more perfect union."

The perfecting of the co-operative union of the nations will require not only the scientific development and the local extension of the processes of conciliation, adjudication, and law formulation throughout the union, but also the removal of the obstacles to the co-operative life and action of the nations. The principal obstacles at the present time are the external monopolies of nations and secret agreements. These external monopolies may be abolished by means of universal agreements for the common and equal use by nations of the sea and the air, which are by nature the common property of all nations; by the extension of the areas of Federal or co-operative union on the land, and by recognizing the "open door" in colonies, dependencies, and spheres of influence. Secret agreements can, it would seem, only be abolished by the gradual establishment of



the principle that all secret agreements are void for all purposes, as contrary to public policy.

It may thus be possible to make the existing union of nations so effective that economic or military force will not be required. If, however, such force should be found necessary, a basis will have been laid for the establishment of a suitable and legally limited supernational authority to wield the force of the union with skill and efficiency, and such a supernational authority will no doubt in due time be evolved.

The practical course, therefore, is, it would seem, to

take as our basis of thought and action the present written constitution of the co-operative union of nations—the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes as originally adopted, the one unanimous act which has ever happened among men, so far as appears, since the dawn of history. On that foundation, it may be possible, by taking thought and proceeding with careful steps, gradually to evolve a more and more perfect co-operative union of the nations, which shall secure to them order and law and permit them to live in peace.

## DO ARMAMENTS PROVOKE WAR?

*Are large armaments as such either provocative of war or deterrents of arbitral and judicial settlement of international difference?*

AFFIRMATIVE,\* By DR. CHARLES E. JEFFERSON

**M**Y ANSWER is, They are, and these are my reasons: First, because of their nature. They are in reality enormous masses of explosives. The explosives are of two kinds, chemical and human. Their presence deranges the normal beating of the world's heart. We can never have national health on this planet until swollen armies and navies are abolished. They create a state of mind out of which war, soon or late, must inevitably come. They are fomenters and feeders of fear. Dump down in front of my house a ton of dynamite or gunpowder, and I at once become nervous. I cannot help it. You may say that they will not hurt me. That does not quiet me a bit. I know there are many bad boys and mischief-making men in the world, and I cannot sleep sound with that pile of explosives at my front door. Great armaments are huge heaps of gunpowder and gun-cotton and dynamite and lyddite and melinite, and when they are piled along all the national frontiers the nations cannot work with quiet pulse or sleep a sleep that is sound. For forty years Europe has tossed and moaned in a hideous nightmare. War itself came at last as a relief. Fear begets suspicion. Out of suspicion springs dislike, dislike deepens into hate, hate rushes on to bloodshed. Fear, suspicion, dislike, hate, slaughter—these are steps in the stairway down which nations pass to hell—shoved down by their armaments.

But armaments are more than metal and chemicals. Armaments are made largely of flesh and blood. Armies are men; so also are navies. Large armies and navies mean tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions of men. Along, then, with your tons of chemical explosives, you have explosive material done up in the bodies of a vast multitude of men. These men must have officers—hundreds, thousands of them—thirty-five thousand to every million men—and out of every hundred of them you can expect one or more Bernhardis—men who believe that war is a biological necessity, that it is the mother of all the virtues, and that every nation must perform those deeds of blood and valor which, above everything else, bring national renown. Bernhardt is not simply a Prussian; he is a Russian, a

Frenchman, an Englishman, an American. He lives everywhere. He is in every army. He is a type which persists. He is a product of the barracks. You cannot eliminate him. You must always reckon with him. He will talk. He will write. He will organize a war party. The bigger the army the taller is Bernhardt, the mightier the war party. You may lament it, but you cannot change it. If you want an army, you must take Bernhardt. If you insist on a big army, you will have a crowd of Bernhardis. It is cruel injustice to say that all military and naval officers want war. Many of them abhor war with an abhorrence deep and true. But you cannot have an army in which there will not be at least one Bernhardt, and in every army in every country today there are many Bernhardis. Now Bernhardt is a provocative of war. He always has his eye on the next war. It is inevitable, imminent. He dreams of power—of conquest. He moves heaven and earth to plant his ideas in the public mind. By his propaganda he makes his nation feared. He kindles at last a fire which may burn up the world.

Huge armies give birth to Bernhardt; also to a twin brother—Krupp. You cannot have an army without Krupp. The army is dependent on him. Without him the army can do nothing. Krupp is the munition-maker. He manufactures the guns and the ships and all the explosives. The bigger your army, the taller becomes Krupp. If the nation votes millions for armament, Krupp is pleased. If it votes tens of millions, Krupp is delighted. If it votes hundreds of millions, Krupp is hilarious. If it votes billions, Krupp dances for joy. The bigger the military and naval budgets, the happier is Krupp, and the mightier. He employs more and more men; adds more acres to his plant; amasses more capital, and extends his influence until he looms the chief man in the nation. He becomes at last almost a demigod, able even to control the national weather. He launches international storms. He covers the heavens with clouds. He sends the lightning, and while the lightning is playing he tightens his clutches on the national treasury. He starves every department of national activity in order to convert national treasure into guns. He has costly machinery. It must be kept running. He has thousands of workmen. They can-

\* The reply to Dr. Jefferson's arguments, by Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U. S. N., will appear in our August issue.